FILED 02-25-2020

	CIRCUIT COURT
-	DANE COUNTY, WI
1	STATE OF WISCONSIN CIRCUIT COURT DANGE & COUNTY
2	* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * *
3) Plaintiff,)
4	vs.) Case No. 18-CV-3122
5	JAMES FETZER, et al.,)
6	Defendants.)
7	* * * * * * * * * * * *
8	TRANSCRIPT OF ORAL ARGUMENTS PROCEEDINGS
9	commencing on the 12th day of December, 2019, at approximately
10	9:11 a.m. before the
11	HONORABLE JUDGE FRANK D. REMINGTON
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14	APPEARANCES: LEONARD POZNER appeared by Attorneys at Law, EMILY FEINSTEIN and EMILY STEDMAN,
15	Quarles & Brady, Madison, Wisconsin, present in court, and JACOB ZIMMERMAN, Meshbesher &
16	Spence, Minneapolis, Minnesota, appearing telephonically
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18	TAMES REPORTED areas and has although at I are
19	JAMES FETZER appeared by Attorney at Law, RICHARD BOLTON Boardman & Clark, Madison,
20	Wisconsin
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23	Reported by: Colleen C. Clark, RPR
24	Official Court Reporter, Branch 8 Dane County Circuit Court
25	215 S. Hamilton Street Room 4109 Madison, WI 53703-3290

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(Proceeding began at 9:11 a.m.)

THE COURT: All right. This is case 18-CV-3122, Leonard Pozner versus James Fetzer. Jake Zimmerman appears on the phone for the plaintiff. Have the appearance in court, please.

MS. FEINSTEIN: Good morning, Your Honor. Feinstein from the law firm of Quarles and Brady here for the plaintiff.

MS. STEDMAN: And Attorney Emily Stedman of Quarles and Brady for the plaintiff.

MR. BOLTON: Rich Bolton for the defendant.

THE COURT: Great. Thanks for coming in this I have on the court's calendar a number of morning. I'll take up the defendant's motions first. motions.

I have reviewed the briefs. I've done some research. And I'll confess to you that I have a draft in progress, in large part, because as you know that the timeline on post-trial motions is pretty short. I'll get the written decision out tomorrow. Depending upon what I hear and learn today, I'll probably give you the answers to the questions and then it will be supported by the written decision. On the other hand, if I hear something today that changes my mind, then you won't get an answer today, I'll have to think about what I heard, but I'll still try to get the written decision out tomorrow.

We're on the court's calendar for an oral 1 2 argument. I always scheduling oral arguments to 3 accomplish a couple things. Ordinarily, it's usually to give an oral decision. Well, due to the nature of this 4 5 case and the issues raised, I think a written decision 6 would be preferable. But, an oral argument does provide 7 me with an opportunity to confirm the issues as I understand them and the arguments as been presented and 8 9 then ask some questions for clarification. 10 I thought the briefs were very, very good and 11 outline the law. There are some nuances I want to ask 12 you, Mr. Bolton, about in the arguments that you've made. 13 And so I don't suppose this will last too long, 14 but I'll turn to each of you, as I usually do in my 15 process, and ask as to the motion you brought, is there 16 anything else you want to add now in addition and not 17 duplicative of what you wrote? 18 MR. BOLTON: No, Your Honor. 19 THE COURT: As to the defendant's motions, is 20 there anything else you'd like to add in addition to and 2.1 not duplicating what you wrote? 22 MR. ZIMMERMAN: As to the plaintiff's motions, 23 Your Honor? 24 THE COURT: Yeah. Who's going to do the 25 talking?

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MS. FEINSTEIN: On the defendant's motion, that's me.

> THE COURT: Okay. Yeah.

MS. FEINSTEIN: Your Honor, we would just add that on summary judgment we provided unrebutted evidence under the standard that Mr. Bolton is raising now at this late hour, and so we would say that if the Court is concerned that the wrong standard of law applies, obviously, we still believe and we've argued that the plaintiff -- or, I'm sorry, that Dr. Fetzer had a duty to raise this affirmative defense and bring it to the Court, and by not raising the affirmative defense, he waived it just like he would have waived a statute of limitations defense if he hadn't raised it or a personal jurisdiction defense if he hasn't waived it. But if the Court is concerned, the Court can just simply revisit the summary judgment and determine as is clear from summary judgment that there was no genuine issue of material fact as to the fact that Defendant Fetzer acted with the requisite intent for if he was a media defendant.

THE COURT: Okay. So, Mr. Bolton, here's how I understand your arguments. You are challenging the Court's prior decision on the motion for summary judgment where I found liability. In particular, you argue, Judge, now retrospective, because you weren't there and not

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retained, based on your review of the record and the files, you believe that one of the elements of defamation you say applies is negligence or a fault, and because that was not addressed directly in this Court's decision on the motion for summary judgment, you think it should have been and because it wasn't, then I should change my mind and vacate the liability and schedule for such other further proceedings as necessary. Basically, broad outline of the first issue?

MR. BOLTON: Yes, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Okay. So undoubtedly, you -- you weren't there, no offense intended, so you'd have to create your argument based on review of the record. first issue, of course, is though you're at a disadvantage, I was there, Ms. Feinstein was there. came a time in the plaintiff's motion to compel the production of Dr. Fetzer's documents supporting his research and the statements he made against Leonard Pozner because Dr. Fetzer refused to produce those documents. You know that?

MR. BOLTON: I do know that, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Okay. And, in the context of the question framed, the plaintiff said, I need these documents if I'm going to be able to adequately prepare for principally the issue of how we characterize the

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plaintiff, whether the plaintiff is -- has injected him or herself into the controversy or a public -- a public -- I forgot the word -- presence?

MR. BOLTON: Figure.

THE COURT: Public figure. Thank you.

But there was, now, in reviewing the transcripts, there was some discussion about -- at least some discussion about how those documents would be used for another similar question as to whether Dr. Fetzer was -- used ordinary care in coming to the statements that he made. Although, maybe those two words "ordinary care" weren't used, don't you agree that in order for the plaintiff to meet its burden of proof, accepting your argument that negligence is a critical element of the claim for defamation, that the plaintiff would have needed the documents and the research upon which Dr. Fetzer relied to argue that he did not exercise ordinary care?

MR. BOLTON: I -- I don't think so, Your Honor. But I will also say that the discussion that was had, as I understand it on the record, was in the -- was in the context as you've indicated of a discovery motion. So it --

THE COURT: How would the plaintiff prove Dr. Fetzer did not exercise ordinary care if the plaintiff was not able to see what facts upon which Dr. Fetzer

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relied in coming to the conclusion that Leonard Pozner falsified and fabricated Noah Pozner's death certificate?

MR. BOLTON: I -- their position is that -- that they established that with the information that they provided to the Court already.

THE COURT: No. I will grant you that I didn't directly address this element when the Court granted the plaintiff summary judgment on liability, and I will say in sort of reconstructing the timeline and analyzing the Court's process, it's because it never came up. You agree that Dr. Fetzer never raised the issue of negligence being an element?

MR. BOLTON: I agree he did not specifically raise it as an element of the plaintiff's case.

THE COURT: Okay. So it never came up. I didn't use the word negligence in a decision. I don't believe that the plaintiff argued or articulated that that was one of the elements that it needed to prove to establish liability.

Do you agree that the Court, the plaintiff, and James Fetzer, himself, assumed that it wasn't an element because in exchange for not releasing his research materials, he essentially agreed that this was a case of a private individual against a private individual?

MR. BOLTON: I don't believe that Professor

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Fetzer contemplated the issue at all.

THE COURT: And how do you -- what facts do you have to support that statement?

MR. BOLTON: Well, the fact that it was not considered by the Court or raised by the plaintiff. I can tell you -- my hesitancy here is that I don't -- I don't want to waive an attorney-client privilege, but if you ask me what facts do I have that Professor Fetzer did not contemplate the issue during the discussion that the Court had, obviously, the discussion with the Court was far broad ranging and it was not -- it was not raised by either the Court or the plaintiff and it was not raised by -- by the plaintiff.

Now, if the suggestion is that, well, Mr. Fetzer or Professor Fetzer necessarily should have known that that was an element, then that same presumption should apply to the plaintiff that they knew it was and that --

THE COURT: Unless -- unless the plaintiff was operating under the reasonable assumption that Dr. Fetzer negated the element by his concession made in the context of the discovery dispute.

MR. BOLTON: Well, I don't -- I wouldn't draw that conclusion because that discussion occurred at an oral argument before the Court and the plaintiff had already submitted their brief in support and in reply of

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summary judgment and had never raised the issue. 1 2 3 4 5 put that one aside. 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 statements against Leonard Pozner. MR. BOLTON: I don't agree with that, Your 15 16 Honor. 17 THE COURT: 18

THE COURT: Okay. So you agree that to respond to your motion then, the first decision I'll have to make is whether there was a waiver or not. All right. Let's

As Ms. Feinstein has just brought up, she says, Judge, okay, fine, although she argues that I -- I should not need to, but if I go ahead now and look back at the affidavits and the evidence submitted by both parties on the cross-motions for summary judgment, the facts are not genuinely in dispute and those facts should yield the Court now retrospective to the conclusion that Dr. Fetzer did not exercise ordinary care in making the defamatory

Okay. What facts -- well, first of all, do you disagree with my statement that Dr. Fetzer approached the cross-motions for summary judgment with the principle that none of the material facts were in dispute?

MR. BOLTON: I'm not sure I -- your question is did Professor Fetzer approach the summary judgment from the perspective that there were no disputed issues of fact?

> THE COURT: Correct.

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MR. BOLTON: Um, I don't -- I don't agree with that.

THE COURT: Well, I don't want to make this like an I gotcha moment, but I've read the transcript. I don't see anywhere in the transcript that he's said that. We had a lengthy oral argument on the cross-motions for summary judgment.

I would submit, Mr. Bolton, and I know it's not fair because you weren't there, you weren't representing him. Dr. Fetzer approached the issue from the perspective that he believed all the facts were not in dispute and that I should come to the conclusion that nobody died at Sandy Hook and that Leonard Pozner falsified and fabricated Noah Pozner's death certificate and, no, there was never even a Noah Pozner. He didn't exist. But do you think that a reasonable -- do you think that that's not a reasonable summary of the Court's consideration of the cross-motions for summary judgment?

MR. BOLTON: I think there was extensive discussion on four elements of the plaintiff's case, and on the issue of truth or falsity, there was extensive discussion and disagreement.

THE COURT: Okay. What facts do you believe were in dispute -- what material facts were genuinely disputed that would preclude me from concluding now that

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Professor Fetzer did not exercise ordinary care?

MR. BOLTON: Your Honor, I'll be honest, I'm not prepared to argue the specifics as if it was the -- as if that was the summary judgment issue before the Court right now. What I would ask is if -- that if the Court wants to consider that issue as if -- as if it is part of the summary judgment analysis, I would request an opportunity then to actually address that issue as -- as an issue raised on summary judgment and as an issue, either as it's been -- as it was addressed in the submissions by the parties or -- and I would want to look carefully at the record.

It may -- it may also be appropriate that -that or it may be inappropriate to consider the issue of
negligence on the existing record as a summary judgment,
given that that issue was not raised as a summary judgment
issue by the plaintiff.

THE COURT: Well, here's the problem with that,

Mr. Bolton, is I don't have time to do that. I'm going to

lose jurisdiction I think in a matter of days by operation

of statute. I can't hold on to this case post jury

verdict. It's going to go to the court of appeals long

before I would give you that time to do that.

MR. BOLTON: Can I respond?

THE COURT: But -- Yeah.

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MR. BOLTON: What I would -- the -- the answer -- your -- your statement assumes the answer. It assumes since I'm going to deny the motion, it has to be done with a certain period of time, but if, in fact, the Court felt that that was an essential issue that needed to be considered -- fully considered as part of the summary judgment ruling, then I think the Court -- and the Court could do that within the time frame that it's talking about, vacate the summary judgment for that consideration.

THE COURT: Well how would I vacate the summary judgment before we actually had the briefs? No. I'm going to tell you right now that runs contrary to the statutes. Statutes are really clear that this train is moving toward the court of appeals and there's nothing the circuit court can do.

I don't think it's unfair for me to ask you that question, Mr. Bolton, and certainly, Ms. Feinstein is prepared to make an argument on it. Because for purposes of finality, if you're right that if there wasn't a waiver -- let's -- assuming that I say there wasn't a waiver, and that now, because it's raised now, it was the Court's responsibility to find facts necessary to meet all the elements, and if one of the elements is considering Dr. Fetzer a media defendant, that is he failed to exercise ordinary care, I think that the Court can and

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should look back at the evidence that was submitted and associated with the cross-motions for summary judgment to see whether the facts relating to that conclusion were genuinely disputed.

Now, you're right. If I concluded that there were one or more material facts genuinely disputed and therefore summary judgment wasn't appropriate then the remedy would be to vacate the decision on summary judgment. But it's the midnight hour. I need to do that today, and I intend to address that here and in my decision.

And I'm just telling you out of complete candor, I mean, it's -- I don't want to trick you, because when the issue's raised and my belief was that was the appropriate methodology for resolving this issue, as Ms. Feinstein raised, untimely raising this issue nonetheless, okay, let's look at and see whether it makes any difference. And I came to that conclusion that that's the methodology because as you know, Mr. Bolton, that the standard of review in the court of appeals on summary judgment is de novo anyway, so you're going to have to -without regard to whether I'm right or wrong, if I don't vacate and don't reverse myself and then I quess I'd have to vacate the jury verdict completely, the court of appeals is going to ask the same question, because the

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court of appeals is not going to reverse and remand for further proceedings if on a de novo review all the evidence is before the court, none of it is genuinely disputed.

So my question back to you is, and you can say -- you can say I don't know right now, I know of no fact. I wanted to give you the opportunity in oral argument to tell me, Judge, well, okay, fine. Here are the facts that I believe were material to the question of ordinary care that the parties were disputing and it would be inappropriate for you to resolve the dispute of that material fact on summary judgment.

MR. BOLTON: And, Your Honor --

THE COURT: I'm saying, I've looked. I can't find a single fact material to that analysis that would lead me to the conclusion there was a genuine dispute.

MR. BOLTON: Well, Your Honor, I -- and I'm not going to speak with the specificity that I think Your Honor wants. What I would say that -- and I would -- and I would rely upon the summary judgment submissions by Professor Fetzer which I think details in -- explains in great detail the basis for the conclusions that he made.

Now, I will admit that in -- in the -- in the hearing before the Court, Professor Fetzer said that there were some parts of what he said that the basis that he --

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he now would recognize were not true, although, he also said that his ultimate conclusion was correct. also spoke and submitted evidence as to the basis for what he said at the time that he said it. And -- and while I don't think malice -- the malice standard is the same as negligence, he did speak to in great detail as to why he was not acting with malice, and I think a lot of that evidence also goes to the issue of negligence.

So I -- I would refer to the submissions and the argument of Professor Fetzer as well that -- that the -that the unstated issue of negligence, it wasn't an issue that was raised, but if we go back and treat it as -- as an issue just from the submissions that were made, I still believe that there's a disputed issue of fact as to whether or not Professor Fetzer acted negligently in the statements that he made. I think -- I think the record supports the basis for why he made the statements that he made at the time. I also believe that -- that if the issue had been -- had been raised, specifically in the summary judgment motion, then the issue might also have been more directly addressed, because I don't believe that the malice -- that malice and negligence are necessarily the same.

So, for instance, in -- in the supreme court --U.S. Supreme Court decision where it said no liability

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without fault, the court said that as to whether or not the standard that a state court wanted to apply, it would -- it would -- it would rely upon the decision of the different -- the different states. Some states have, in fact, continued with a malice standard, that the false standard is malice, others have said negligence, but the two are not necessarily the same.

THE COURT: Well, I agree with that. And I think -- I wish I would have seen this, I don't remember seeing it at the time I had my oral argument, but the Wisconsin Jury Instruction 2500 provides an excellent law note for judges on how you look at types of defamation actions. And I would respectfully say, Mr. Bolton, you're kind of conflating some issues unnecessarily.

The actual malice that was set forth in the New York Times v. Sullivan case becomes relevant when the defamation is between a public figure and a media defendant or a private individual in a matter of public concern with the constitutional privilege. There's no question that the context of the waiver that Dr. Fetzer made knowingly and understandingly was to concede that Noah Pozner was not a public figure. That was addressed directly, it was stated clearly and concisely; that he had not injected himself in a matter of public concern at the time those statements were made.

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The concept of negligence comes up in a situation of a private individual who's suing a media defendant or a private individual in a matter of public concern with a constitutional privilege, and that's the Dalton case. And the element does, in a private individual against the media defendant, Gertz teaches us that negligence is an element, again, where there's a public figure, which doesn't apply, then the actual malice.

So though we talked about actual malice at the time of the discovery dispute and when your client waived, it was at that time in the context of how we characterized Leonard Pozner. Once Dr. Fetzer waived his claim as to Leonard Pozner and agreed to, essentially, that Leonard Pozner was for purposes of the Court's analysis and for defamation was a private individual, then the issue then became whether it was a private individual against a private individual with no nonconstitutional privileges and no -- no privileges. Now the issue after verdict is, courts should have taken a step back and addressed more clearly the characterization of Dr. Fetzer that he was -that it would be err to assume that he was simply a private individual, that he always claimed he was a media, although he said he was a researcher -- academic researcher, nonetheless, that he didn't waive that. Ι

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understand that's the waiver argument. The transcript goes on and we talk about that.

But the point is, I'm going to ask you one more time and I'm going to leave it at that, I mean, even if the negligence question becomes relevant, because I conclude that Dr. Fetzer did not waive his privileges associated with being a member of the media, the Court can and should then now look back at the record to determine whether the plaintiff would be entitled to summary judgment on this additional element presently. Ms. Feinstein, that's what your -- you argued, that's what you were asking me to do anyway.

So Mr. Bolton, I can't punt it, there's not enough time, and I don't believe -- right now I'm telling you that I -- I see that there's any genuine dispute as to the facts material to the question of negligence, or stated alternatively, whether Dr. Fetzer exercised ordinary care. Can you think of any fact that he responded to or suggested that he -- that the parties were disputing that would preclude summary judgment on the question of negligence?

MR. BOLTON: Yes, and I refer back to the submissions that Professor Fetzer made on the summary judgment and the discussion, including his explanation for why at the time he made his statements he felt that --

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that the birth [sic] certificate was a fabrication. Professor Fetzer, there's extensive evidence as to differences between the birth certificate that professor -- or that Mr. Pozner presented to publicly versus what was characterized as the official birth certificate. And -- and so there was extensive discussion about those differences and the basis for -- for why Professor Fetzer reached that conclusion.

Now, Your Honor concluded that the differences -- that you did not believe the differences were material so as to preclude summary judgment on the issue of truth or false -- falsity. But that's -- but -but that conclusion is, again, is separate and distinct from the issue of negligence. So there was Professor Fetzer --

THE COURT: Well what more would Fetzer tell me were I to give him a new hearing on it? First of all, he marked and asked me to read the book, which I did review, which should have outlined all of his research supporting all of his statements. I heard him say and in the context of his motion for summary judgment, that he believed that everything he said was true and correct and then, in fact, at one point, Mr. Bolton, Dr. Fetzer said, I welcome the lawsuit because it would provide for me now a public forum to prove that nobody died at Sandy Hook.

I'm telling you right now, and I'd like you to weigh in on it, I don't remember a single occasion in which Dr. Fetzer responded to a fact propounded by Leonard Pozner where Dr. Fetzer said, That's not true.

MR. BOLTON: Well, I don't have the record in front of me, Your Honor, but I -- but I do believe that -- that the submission -- now you disagreed whether they were material or not and that's -- that's the prerogative of the Court, and I understand that. But as to whether or not, for instance -- and you began the discussion by saying, asking me whether or not Professor Fetzer, isn't it true that he conceded at least the four non-media elements of -- of defamation, and I said, He did not concede the issue of truth or falsity. And -- and I -- and I still think that's true.

THE COURT: What do you mean by that? Let's talk about truth or falsity. Because I said then and I'll say now, when I reflect on the evidence, I mean, it's clear that both parties admitted there were different versions of the death certificate being circulated. One had a number, one had the name of the funeral home. There were — that after listening to the evidence in summary judgment, I said that Dr. Fetzer and the parties — and the plaintiff agreed that — that there were different versions of the death certificate being circulated around,

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and that all Dr. Fetzer had proved that was just that; there are different versions.

Leonard Pozner explained or Attorney Zimmerman explained, well, that makes sense because the single piece of paper moves through a multiple of different hands and entities and organizations, each placing their mark upon Dr. Fetzer seemed to acknowledge that because that's when he reversed himself and said -- he admitted that his claim that it -- that certain opinions he had at the time were no longer relevant but his conclusion still remained. He gave up the complaint about the border around the document being placed on it. He also seemed to abandon the argument about the different fonts. The explanation being that if the funeral home had a typewriter it might be in Times New Roman and if the medical examiner had it in Courier, the font would be different as to each individual. You agree he confessed error in some of the bases of his assertion that the death certificate was a fabrication?

MR. BOLTON: I would call it an admission rather than a confession, but --

THE COURT: Okay.

MR. BOLTON: -- but I agree with you.

THE COURT: So when you say that I didn't think they were material, I said in conclusion that -- that

there were different versions of the same certificate does 1 not make any of them a fake or a fabrication. 2 3 So -- well, let's turn to you, Ms. Feinstein. You agree that there are a number of different versions of 4 the single death certificate floating around? 5 6 MS. FEINSTEIN: I think that's right, Your 7 I think one of the primary reasons that there are kind of two big differences is one is kept, I want to say, 8 within the county and one is kept within the state 10 records. 11 THE COURT: And both parties admitted that, 12 yeah, you've got two death certificates and they're 13 different. 14 MS. FEINSTEIN: I -- I would say the differences are minimal. The substance of the death certificate are 15 16 the same, but yes. THE COURT: Well, they're different. 17 18 So when you say, Mr. Bolton, that I didn't think 19 it was material, I want to push back and say all of that's 20 material, but it just wasn't generally disputed. I mean, 2.1 Leonard Pozner did not dispute the point that Dr. Fetzer 22 was making that there was a version out there that didn't 23 have a number stamped on it that was placed later, but he 24 explained the reason why the number was not on that 25 version was because it hadn't been passed on to the next

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step of the proceeding. So what fact did your client submit to me in the context of his motion for summary judgment that I concluded was not material?

MR. BOLTON: My -- Your Honor, my -- my comment previously was that when you addressed the issue of materiality, materiality went to the issue of truth or falsity, but it -- it did not go -- it does not go to the issue of negligence.

THE COURT: All right. Well let's leave it at that, because I'm not going to get a -- I mean, I appreciate it. I think here's what I will say is you've not told me any particular fact that you think is genuinely in dispute that would preclude me from now concluding that the plaintiff was, had it been raised, would be entitled to summary judgment on the negligence, but you're not waiving the ability to argue that later on, on a de novo review in the court of appeals, which you'd have a right to do anyway.

MR. BOLTON: Well, and I would say, you know, you noted that Professor Fetzer relied on the entire book and other evidence. The -- the issue that the plaintiffs and that the Court wanted -- wanted to narrow it to the four specific statements, but I also think that the issue of whether or not Professor Fetzer had a reasonable basis for stating that the birth [sic] certificate was a

1 fabrication, I think -- I think the broader context is 2 also extraordinarily relevant, because obviously, the birth certificate occurs in the context of -- of the 3 broader analysis. 4 THE COURT: Death certificate? 5 6 MR. BOLTON: Pardon? 7 THE COURT: Death certificate? You said birth certificate. 8 9 MR. BOLTON: I'm -- yeah. I'm sorry. Yep. 10 I -- Thank you. 11 THE COURT: All right. I'll address that in my 12 written decision. 13 Mr. Bolton, you'd like a new trial, and you 14 believe that when Mr. Zimmerman asked Dr. Fetzer about his 15 contemptuous behavior, that was a reversible error to 16 allow the jury to hear that. Is there anything more you 17 want to --18 MR. BOLTON: No, Your Honor. 19 THE COURT: So why do you think that that was a 20 punitive sanction? Why do you think that was a punitive 2.1 sanction? You agree that Dr. Fetzer confessed that he was in contempt of court. He admitted that he violated the 22 23 Court's confidentiality order and that he did something 24 that the Court took great pains to admonish him not to do. 25 Right?

MR. BOLTON: We -- we did not -- we -- at the 1 2 contempt hearing, that was our position, Your Honor. 3 THE COURT: Okay. And that the purge condition that I said is, okay -- actually over Mr. Zimmerman's 4 arguments about what the purge conditions should be, I 5 6 said, okay, just get it back. But -- but as you --7 actually, I confirmed, as you just said, put the genie back in the bottle. And we know when he came to court, he 8 9 was not able to do that. One of the, I think it was 10 Mr. Halbig, refused to return what had been sent to him 11 via another individual, correct? MR. BOLTON: That's right. That's correct, Your 12 13 Honor. 14 THE COURT: Okay. So I assume Dr. Fetzer is not 15 arguing that I should have -- having failed to satisfy the 16 purge conditions, I assume he's not suggesting I should 17 have put him in jail? 18 MR. BOLTON: Say that again, Your Honor? 19 THE COURT: I assume he's not now arguing that 20 the appropriate remedy for his failure to purge his 2.1 contempt was that I should put him in jail. 22 MR. BOLTON: Well, Your Honor, in all due 23 respect, I have to believe that that's somewhat of a 24 rhetorical question, but I will answer it as a 25 non-rhetorical question. We are not asking to have

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Professor Fetzer jailed.

THE COURT: Okay. And I could have imposed additional monetary sanctions up to \$2,000 a day and I I essentially said it is what it is. There's not much we can do about it. Wolfgang Halbig has the image. Dr. Fetzer confessed that he was working with Wolfgang Halbig to pursue their theory that the man sitting in court was not the same man holding a child at the time of the shooting at Sandy Hook.

Do you know -- how do you respond, and I'll give you an opportunity to respond, how do you respond to the point that Dr. Fetzer's behavior, and his -- and his description of his motivation to involve Wolfgang Halbig into this now new theory that there's a new actor portraying the person of Leonard Pozner in court, and the fact that maybe Dr. Fetzer even said Wolfgang Halbig would be a surprise rebuttal witness, does that not go to Leonard Pozner's claim for post-traumatic stress syndrome, and wasn't it made relevant when his doctor said that it is the actions of James Fetzer that precludes him from recovering from the death of his child? Isn't it relevant -- wasn't it relevant that now, by violating the court order and disseminating the picture to Halbig and making the assertion that Fetzer did, that this is not even a real Leonard Pozner, it's a new actor, doesn't that

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go to Leonard Pozner's damages on the stress that he has been receiving at the hands of Dr. Fetzer?

MR. BOLTON: No.

THE COURT: Why not?

MR. BOLTON: There's no -- there's no connection between that -- between that disclosure and anything to do with -- with Mr. Pozner.

THE COURT: Mr. Pozner testified that he read and Dr. Fetzer did not deny, in fact, he admitted that Dr. Fetzer's new theory was, is that the man who sat for the deposition, who was appearing in court was a new actor, different than the actor which portrayed Leonard Pozner at the time of the shooting. You agree that that was his position?

MR. BOLTON: Say --

THE COURT: Dr. Fetzer told me that the reason he sent the image out was because he believed that the picture of the man who sat for the deposition, which was the same man who was in the court, is not the same man who was holding a child at the time the Sandy Hook massacre was publicized; that those were two different people. Do you remember him saying that?

MR. BOLTON: I do, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Okay. And I assume it's still your client's position that the man who came and testified in

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court, who testified in the deposition, is not Leonard Pozner, that nobody died at Sandy Hook, and he never had a child named Noah. That this is one more crisis actor hired by the Obama administration to perpetuate the fraud that somebody died at Sandy Hook. That's your client's position. That, I assume, is still your client's position now?

MR. BOLTON: I $\operatorname{\mathsf{I}}$ -- I'm not sure that -- whatever his position is right now is --

THE COURT: That was his position at the time.

MR. BOLTON: That's correct.

THE COURT: And so Leonard Pozner testified or through Mr. Zimmerman asked him what the consequences, something to the effect that this was his worst nightmare, that just when he thought that the passage of time would make his grieving more tolerable, here this man who previously accused him of falsifying a death certificate for a child he doesn't have is now accusing this man of not even being the real Leonard Pozner but an actor pretending to be so. Why is that not relevant to the testimony of that very same person who sat before the jury to say the nightmare never ends?

MR. BOLTON: Well, the reason I -- and I -- and the reason as I stated in our motion and as I stated to the Court on two different occasions, the issue that was

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presented to the jury was the issue of damages resulting from defamatory statements. And -- and so what you're saying is that this -- this may be relevant to the claim post-traumatic stress. It's not related to the defamation statements that was presented to the jury --

THE COURT: Well it is -- it is in the sense that the four statements that the plaintiff sued on for defamation, one way or the other, captured your client's position that nobody died at Sandy Hook; that Leonard Pozner, if there ever was a Leonard Pozner, fabricated a death certificate for a Noah Pozner who may never have existed; and that Dr. Fetzer said the whole reason for violating the court's order was to gather evidence in support of his defense, namely, to call Wolfgang Halbig as a rebuttal witness to prove that the accusation that Pozner fabricated the death certificate was true. Did not Dr. Fetzer make his actions relevant when he incorporated his work with Halbig and his suggestion that Halbig should testify at trial?

MR. BOLTON: I don't agree with that, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Well, that's -- fair enough. I don't want -- I'm not expecting my arguments here to be so persuasive as you'll sort of say, you know, I agree with you. I give up on that one. I mean, I just -- I can't

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1 really give you a meaningful opportunity to respond unless 2 I tell you what my feeling is in terms of reconstructing 3 the evidence and addressing the issues that you raised. MR. BOLTON: But --4 THE COURT: Is there anything more, 5 6 Ms. Feinstein, you'd like to add to the -- the kind of 7 forensic analysis of the decision to allow the jury to hear that Mr. Fetzer violated the court's order? 8 9 MS. FEINSTEIN: No, Your Honor. 10 THE COURT: I don't know the sufficiency of the 11 evidence argued, Mr. Bolton. It's a good argument. 12 don't -- is there anything else you want to add? The sufficiency of the evidence, it's a pretty high standard 13 14 to prove. Anything else you'd like to tell me before I give you my ruling on your motions? 15 16 MR. BOLTON: No, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Anything else?

MS. FEINSTEIN: No, Your Honor.

THE COURT: I'm going to issue a written decision, and I appreciate you answering my questions.

I'm not going to vacate the summary judgment motion decision -- not going to vacate the order granting the plaintiff partial summary judgment. I'll address the issue of waiver and whether it was a harmless error, even considering now a retrospective analysis of the facts that

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were submitted in the cross-motions.

I'm not going to grant your motion for a new I do not think it was an error to allow the jury to hear what it did.

And I do believe there is sufficient evidence, and I'm not going to grant the motion for a new trial on sufficiency evidence.

Let's turn to the plaintiff's post-verdict motions. Permanent injunction. Does Dr. Fetzer intend to keep repeating the statement that Mr. Pozner's son's death certificate is a fake which Dr. Fetzer has proven on a dozen or more grounds?

MR. BOLTON: Professor Fetzer does not intend to make statements that -- that Mr. Pozner fabricated the death certificate.

THE COURT: Does your client intend to then make a statement that Mr. Pozner sent a death certificate which turned out to be a fabrication?

MR. BOLTON: Um, what I would say is that -that statement as it appears in the publications that -that the plaintiff raised, that it is not our intention to continue to publish those or to make those statements. other words, the statements that are in the book in the Chapter 11, I believe it is, and in the -- and in the -in the memo or the blog, it is not his intention and --

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THE COURT: Well, let's make very clear, because I'm going to ask you the same question from two different perspectives. It's been suggested that maybe Dr. Fetzer doesn't even oppose an injunction that prohibits him from making the four statements that were shown to the jury that were marked as an exhibit as stated in that exhibit.

MR. BOLTON: As stated and as presented to the jury, we -- we do not contest that.

THE COURT: Okay. So by way -- by way of stipulation of the parties, I'll go ahead and grant the injunction barring Dr. Fetzer from making those four statements.

Now, but let's make very clear, because you've -- you've said something that I think is nuanced. You've said that furthermore, your client does not believe that -- I guess your client's not going to say that Mr. Pozner falsified or fabricated the death certificate. In fact, I think he testified that he claimed he never said Mr. Pozner did that, it was his theory that, using the passive voice, that the death certificate was false or was a fabrication without attribution to any particular individual. So your client will agree that he's not going to say Leonard Pozner falsified or fabricated a death certificate? "Yes" or "no."

MR. BOLTON: That is correct.

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THE COURT: Okay. Does he intend to say that Noah Pozner's death certificate is false or a fabrication without regard to whom may have done so?

MR. BOLTON: I don't know whether he intends to state that or not. But what I would also say is that -as I said, so I'm not -- I'm not shying away from what I said. I think if he -- I think the statement, if it were made, that the birth [sic] certificate was a -- was not -was a fabrication and did not state that -- that Mr. Pozner did the fabrication, I don't think that that would -- I think that would be -- to go that far would be an improper prior restraint.

THE COURT: Okay. Well then -- then I want you to rethink your -- your concession. Because when I look at the second statement -- well, even the first statement. The first statement says, which I guess you said you agreed to, but let's make sure that that's what your client is willing to do. The first statement says Mr. Pozner's son's death certificate is fake. So if you tell me now that they intend -- he intends to continue to make the assertion that Mr. Pozner's son's death certificate is a fake, how does that not violate the order if I issue it as stipulated by the parties?

MR. BOLTON: Well, okay. Then let me -- let me backtrack then. My -- it is my -- it is our position that

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and -- and -- and as I understood the plaintiff's position was that that statement in the context of paragraph -- of Chapter 11 in the book, that that particular, in that context, that it clearly raised the implication that Mr. Pozner fabricated -- did the fabrication. But I think if you in -- in another context, the statement that -- if made that the -- that the birth -- or that the death certificate was -- is a fabrication, that does not implicate Mr. Pozner, then I think that that is not --

THE COURT: I don't know how -- Mr. Bolton, that's kind of a revisionistic theory. When you look at the four statements that were shown to the jury, that at least at one time you agreed to enjoin your client, all of them are written in the passive voice. None of them make the assertion that Mr. Pozner falsified or fabricated the death certificate. Let me read them to you and see if you agree.

Mr. Pozner's son's death certificate is fake. That doesn't say who faked it. It just said Noah Pozner's death certificate is a fake. You agree?

> MR. BOLTON: I agree, but -- but, Your Honor --THE COURT: Okay. Let's just go through it. MR. BOLTON: All right.

THE COURT: The second one. Mr. Pozner sent a death certificate, which turned out to be a fabrication.

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You agree that's a passive voice. That doesn't say Mr. Pozner fabricated, it's just that he sent a death certificate that turned out to be a fabrication. That does not accuse Mr. Pozner of fabricating the death certificate. Do you agree? That statement. MR. BOLTON: That statement, in isolation, I agree. THE COURT: Third one was, As many Sandy Hook researchers are aware, the very document Pozner circulated in 2014, with its inconsistent tones, fonts and clear digital manipulation, was clearly a forgery. Now that one's a little closer, but it doesn't say in the direct voice, Leonard Pozner forged the document. It just says he circulated a document which was a forgery. That doesn't really accuse Leonard Pozner of forging the document, does it? MR. BOLTON: Okay. I agree with that, Your Honor. THE COURT: And then the last one, Mr. Pozner's son's death certificate turned out to be a fabrication. That also doesn't accuse Leonard Pozner of doing the fabricating, right? MR. BOLTON: I agree. THE COURT: So if I -- if I enjoin Dr. Fetzer from making these statements, unless you tell me something

that I should reflect on, if you come back and I find out he said Noah Pozner's death certificate is a forgery, it's false and a fabrication, I don't read the injunction to allow him that latitude.

MR. BOLTON: Okay. Your Honor, you've persuaded me. And so I -- I will backtrack. What -- to the extent, what we would agree to is to not make statements that indicate that -- or imply that Mr. Pozner was responsible for the fabrication. But I agree with Your Honor that to the extent that statements are made regarding the death certificate that do not directly imply or state that Mr. Pozner was -- was responsible for creating the fabrication, then I -- then I don't agree that the -- that an injunction should go that far.

And that's why, you know, the -- I believe it may have been a second circuit decision that I cited in my brief, that where they -- where they address that very issue. That -- that context is important. And the statement in one context, and -- and that was the context in which the plaintiff presented this case, that the context in Chapter 11 was that those four statements implied that -- that Mr. Pozner was -- was responsible for --

THE COURT: No. But Justice -- Judge -- Judge Sykes --

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MR. BOLTON: Pardon me?

"An emerging modern trend, however, acknowledges the general rule," against prior restraint, "but allows for the possibility of a narrowly tailored permanent injunctive relief as a remedy for defamation as long as the injunction prohibits only the repetition of the specific statements found at trial to be false and defamatory." So if I take Judge Sykes' advice to heart, we know that the four statements were shown to the jury as an exhibit, were found by the jury to be false and defamatory --

MR. BOLTON: No, the jury did not find that. In our case? Or in -- I'm not sure I understand. Maybe I misunderstood you.

THE COURT: Okay. Well, no. You're right. I guess they assumed them to be false and defamatory; that I found them to be false and defamatory.

MR. BOLTON: That I agree with.

THE COURT: That that at least then meets the narrowly tailored remedy to prohibit only the repetition of the specific statements filed by the Court to be false and defamatory. And that would be appropriate prior restraint notwithstanding the First Amendment. Do you agree?

MR. BOLTON: I don't -- I don't agree, but --1 2 but as I -- as I said, but I'm not intending to -- it is 3 not my intent to object to a -- an injunction that would prohibit Professor Fetzer from making statements that --4 5 that Mr. Pozner was responsible -- was personally 6 responsible for --7 THE COURT: Okay. But how --MR. BOLTON: -- a fabrication. 8 9 THE COURT: -- do we -- What do we tell Leonard 10 Pozner if that was the limits of his success? 11 Dr. Fetzer goes out and says Noah Pozner's death 12 certificate is a fabrication. Isn't that tantamount to him reiterating his theory that Noah Pozner never existed? 13 14 MR. BOLTON: I -- I -- I don't think so, Your 15 Honor. And -- and --16 THE COURT: Well, okay. But --MR. BOLTON: But --17 18 THE COURT: -- Dr. Fetzer --19 MR. BOLTON: But what I would also say is 20 that -- that the context of this case is the defamation --2.1 the defamation of Mr. Pozner. So -- so, for instance, 22 what you're getting at in a sense is --23 THE COURT: Well, but Leonard Pozner --MR. BOLTON: -- if the --24 25 THE COURT: Leonard Pozner maintained he had a

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son named Noah who was murdered at Sandy Hook. And so Leonard Pozner testified that the hardest part of getting over and the harm that he suffered at the hands of Dr. Fetzer was that to say that Noah Pozner's death certificate was a false fabrication was tantamount to saying, as Dr. Fetzer said directly, that there was never anyone named Noah Pozner; that, according to Dr. Fetzer's book, the pictures are somehow or another a part of Reuben Vabner who is a different individual. So you agree that your own client's theory of this event was that there never was a person named Noah Pozner and that's what he said and that does he continue, notwithstanding the court trial, in his -- to make the statements that there never was a child named Noah Pozner?

MR. BOLTON: What I'll say is that I don't believe that statement is defamatory of Mr. Pozner. This case was postured as a defamation. And the plaintiffs went to great lengths to say we do not want to litigate the basic theory of the book -- of the entire book. And -- and what Your Honor and what the plaintiffs are arguing for is basically an injunction against the -- the broader issue. And the broader issue was not litigated and it was not -- it was not -- it was a strategic decision by the plaintiffs, and Your Honor went to considerable lengths to say we're not -- we're not --

THE COURT: If that --1 2 MR. BOLTON: -- we're not litigating whether or 3 not Sandy Hook occurred. THE COURT: If that was the -- if that was true, 4 Mr. Bolton, and that was the limits, then why did Leonard 5 6 Pozner -- why did Attorney Zimmerman ask me to order 7 genetic tests to prove that his genetic material compared to the genetic material that the medical examiner had for 8 9 Noah Pozner proved that Leonard Pozner was Noah Pozner's 10 father? If it was just all about, okay, I'm sorry I said 11 you fabricated it, why would -- why do you think the 12 plaintiff asked for genetic tests? MR. BOLTON: It was related to exploring 13 14 defenses. 15 THE COURT: What is -- explain that. 16 MR. BOLTON: And the plaintiff -- and the 17 defendant did not define the scope of the case and Your 18 Honor said we're not litigating whether or not -- you 19 know, the broader issue raised by the book. 20 What I -- what I would say is this, Your Honor. And the concession that I would make is that Professor 2.1 22 Fetzer would agree not to publish -- and, in fact, I 23 believe has already withdrawn from any -- any access from 24 his websites or otherwise Chapter 11 from the book. 25 It's -- that -- that was the context in which the

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defamation case was raised and we would agree to basically withdraw that chapter from -- from the public record.

THE COURT: Okay. Here's what I'm going to do. Although you offered and then retracted, I'm going to issue a permanent injunction prohibiting the defendant from saying the four exact statements that were shown to the jury as they were written. The injunction will be tailored narrowly and they will be limited to that, the four statements that were published as an exhibit.

I will tell you this, I don't read those four statements to be so narrow -- narrowly drafted. If, in fact, I find out on a motion for contempt that Dr. Fetzer continues to assert that the death certificate is a fake or that it turned out to be a fabrication or that it was clearly a forgery, without regard to who did it, that's going to be a violation as -- as I understand this narrowly tailored injunction.

What I will say, and I won't put it in my injunction, if, on the other hand, picking up on what you just said, Mr. Bolton, if James Fetzer wants to forget about Noah Pozner and Leonard Pozner and continue his theory that nobody died at Sandy Hook but goes forward never mentioning the Pozners or anything about the Pozners, then -- then I think they -- Ms. Feinstein, do you agree that then they've skirted around the parameters

of this narrowly tailored injunction? 1 2 MS. FEINSTEIN: Your Honor --3 MR. ZIMMERMAN: Your Honor, this is Mr. Zimmerman, and I can address that. 4 5 THE COURT: Okay. Mr. Zimmerman. 6 MR. ZIMMERMAN: I think the answer to that is 7 That unless they were to say Noah Pozner must have died somewhere else in Sandy Hook or maybe Noah Pozner was 8 the only person to have died at Sandy Hook, then maybe 10 that is at least theoretically true. But the problem is 11 the record has established that Noah Pozner died in Sandy 12 Hook, Connecticut on that day and a death certificate 13 issued. The defamation then arises, essentially, 14 automatically, right? Because we all agree it is conceded that Mr. Pozner circulated a death certificate for his 15 16 son. That, in Connecticut, would be a crime. So saying 17 he circulated a death certificate, as Your Honor noted, 18 that turned out to be fake, is defamation. 19 And by implication, because Mr. Pozner, as they 20 have said, is the most well known of all the Sandy Hook 2.1 parents and Noah Pozner is well known to be a Sandy Hook 22 victim, I think if he comes out and says, Nobody died at 23 Sandy Hook, it necessarily means Mr. Pozner circulated a

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fake death certificate for his son. And I don't -- I

don't see how they can get around that unless they were to

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implication, that's an indirect violation of the Court's injunction and tantamount to saying that the death certificate which shows that Noah Pozner did die at Sandy Hook is impliedly itself a fabrication. But I'm going to go ahead and begin by granting the request for injunctive relief and draw that narrowly tailored.

Now, I want to say something I will address in my decision, because it's been reported widely among, I think, uninformed people. You agree that the First Amendment does not protect defamatory speech, right, Mr. Bolton?

MR. BOLTON: Um, I pause because the -- the -- I don't want to give -- there are supreme court cases that also say that the statement that the First Amendment does not protect defamatory is -- is an overstatement. What -- what I believe to be the case is that it does not violate the -- the First Amendment to penalize defamatory statements. But I'm not sure that -- and I know it may be a distinction without a meaning, but I know there are supreme court cases that also say when we say, for instance, that the First Amendment does not protect or apply to defamatory statements or statements that incite or whatever it be, that that is -- that that's not technically correct. But I -- but if what you're saying is, is it -- is it okay to sanction defamatory speech

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consistent with the First Amendment, I believe that the cases do say that.

THE COURT: All right. Okay. The last issue is attorney's fees. I'm going to deny -- for reasons I'll set forth in the record, I'm going to deny the request for attorney's fees. But for the fact that I don't have legal authority, I would grant attorney's fees.

I don't read Nationstar as extending the holding in a foreclosure where the Court has longstanding power of an equitable court to extend to an actions at law. There's just nothing in Nationstar that makes me believe that the Wisconsin Supreme Court intended to apply the same principles there to cases purely at law. If the supreme court wants to extend it, that's up to the supreme court.

I think, factually speaking, this would be a good case to consider an issue that -- where it should be extended. But as a circuit court judge bound by what I believe to be the limits of the holding, I can only read Nationstar to apply to the facts of that case and the longstanding historical precedent that a court in a foreclosure both acts in law and in equity.

I read <u>Nationstar</u> to say that where a court sits in equity, there is an opportunity to fashion that type of make-whole remedy, but an action in a defamation action is

1	an action at law, and that good or bad, the American Rule
2	applies, which which means each party bears their own
3	costs.
4	Finally, last but not least, did you get a
5	chance to see the bill of costs, Mr. Bolton?
6	MR. BOLTON: The bill of costs that was
7	submitted?
8	THE COURT: Correct.
9	MR. BOLTON: Yeah. I don't have any there
10	was nothing that I objected to.
11	THE COURT: Okay. The Court will then grant the
12	plaintiff's request for statutory costs. That does, I
13	believe, have a \$500 attorney's fees provided for in the
14	statute.
15	MR. BOLTON: Good heavens.
16	THE COURT: There you go.
17	MR. BOLTON: I'm just teasing, Your Honor.
18	THE COURT: Okay. Anything further?
19	MS. STEDMAN: No, Your Honor.
20	THE COURT: Did I address all the issues that
21	the plaintiff wanted to do post verdict?
22	MS. STEDMAN: Yes, Your Honor.
23	THE COURT: All right. Anything that I missed,
24	Mr. Bolton?
25	MR. BOLTON: You I believe you have addressed

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our motions and our response to their motions.

So the -- the issue that -- and I'm -- I anticipate that the Court will address this in its -- in its written decision, the issue -- the public policy issue in terms of remoteness and incitement you did not specifically address, but I -- I interpret from your -- your statements that that will be addressed and that you're -- you're not accepting my argument on that.

THE COURT: Well, I did not address it here.

Let me just ask you one question. Do you deny that

Leonard Pozner testified as to the damages that he

believed he suffered as a result of reading the four

defamatory statements?

MR. BOLTON: I don't believe that that -- I do not believe that he -- I believe that he -- he did, but he also indicated, and -- and Dr. Lubit indicated that the third-party threats and harassment were the most damaging in terms of the diagnosis of a second post-traumatic stress disorder. So I don't -- I don't -- I don't believe that the record supports that you can -- that you can separate the third-party threats and --

THE COURT: Okay.

MR. BOLTON: -- can conclude that the damages are completely unrelated -- that the jury awarded are completely unrelated to those.

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THE COURT: So you -- if I understand what you're saying, you concede that Leonard Pozner testified as to the damages he suffered directly or as a result of the defamatory statements.

MR. BOLTON: I don't believe that he testified that those damages -- that that was the same as what Dr. Lubit testified to as the basis for his opinions.

THE COURT: That wasn't my question. My question was did he -- did -- I reviewed the record. you agree that Leonard Pozner testified then, something to the words of the effect, that when he read the defamatory statements it did two things. It said, accepting as true, it meant that, I was a liar; I didn't have a child; that I was engaged in this conspiracy; and that it prevented me from getting over the grief of the loss of my child; that he testified at length about how those four defamatory statements made him feel, including that he felt that he was not able to recover from the death of his child. You -- is that an unfair characterization of -- of that portion of Mr. Pozner's testimony?

MR. BOLTON: I don't have it in front of me, but -- but if you say that -- that those statements -- but if I look at -- if I look at this record, if I look at the argument and the testimony by Dr. Lubit and by Mr. Pozner and by argument by counsel, if I'm -- for me to conclude

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that the damage awarded by the jury is separable from the third-party complaints or harassment and threats, I -- I would have to conclude that I may not have been present for the trial. I mean --

THE COURT: Okay. So you're saying -- I think what you're saying is that even though there was some evidence that there was damages directly as a result of the statements, there was also more impactful evidence about third-party harassment that Pozner claimed were related to the four defamatory statements.

MR. BOLTON: I would say that, in fact, what we heard most dramatically, we heard -- we heard an audio presentation, and then -- and then the statements were, if I recall right, and I -- I may not recall, I think a transcription of the audio then was also displayed to the jury.

THE COURT: Why didn't you object to that?

MR. BOLTON: Pardon?

THE COURT: Why didn't you object to that?

MR. BOLTON: Because I think -- I guess

because -- for instance, when I look at the -- when I look

instruction for causation, causation is a fairly broad

at, as Your Honor asked me to do, to look at the

instruction, so I didn't think it was -- it seems to me

that it raises an issue, the public policy issue that I

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raise, and that is -- and the public policy issues are, as I understand, typically raised post verdict when the Court has the full -- both the Court and any appellate court has the full context then of it.

So I guess -- I think it -- and as I've -- as I've argued in our brief, I think the issue is not so much, for instance, my -- my argument in part is that there wasn't sufficient evidence to connect the third-party complaints to the -- to the publications.

THE COURT: So why didn't you -- why didn't you object?

MR. BOLTON: Pardon me?

THE COURT: Why didn't you object and keep the whole audiotape out and the suggestion that Richards somehow or another acted at the behest of Fetzer?

MR. BOLTON: Well, Your Honor, I mean the notion then that -- I mean, the dilemma then is that when you've got a remote cause for public policy purposes, there's intervening cause or supervening cause, the -- the dilemma then is that if you want to argue that -- that these are too remote but that they are actually causative, you -- the suggestion of the plaintiff and Your Honor is that if you think something else was responsible for the damage but that it's not actionable for public policy reasons or not, then you should exclude that evidence. But as soon

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as I exclude the evidence that I think is -- is the intervening cause, you don't have intervening cause, for instance, if -- if you don't present the evidence of the intervening cause.

So if you say, well, if you think that that -that was the cause of the factor and that that's not actionable, you should have kept it out so that the only evidence -- so that you shouldn't -- you -- you then can't argue that something else was causative. So it -- I think it's -- I don't think it's so much an admissibility issue as a question of whether or not that type of remoteness --

THE COURT: Okay. Fair enough.

MR. BOLTON: -- is actionable.

THE COURT: Fair enough. I actually think that had you objected to it and had I known Dr. Fetzer's response to your cross-examination, I probably wouldn't have overruled the objection. You asked Dr. Fetzer something like, how do you even know that Lucy Richards' statements had anything to do with Dr. Fetzer. Do you remember asking him -- Mr. Pozner that question?

MR. BOLTON: Yeah. And --

THE COURT: And he said --

MR. BOLTON: I may have misunderstood your

question.

THE COURT: He said --

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MR. BOLTON: I remember asking Mr. Pozner that question. I don't remember asking Mr. Fetzer that question.

THE COURT: I'm sorry. You did ask Mr. Pozner.

If I said Fetzer, I misspoke. And Pozner said, well,

clearly they were or he understood them to be connected

because as he understood the Lucy Richards was enjoined by

the criminal court as a condition of her conviction that

she not access to or read Dr. Fetzer's blog or book, which

does, I think, support your probably decision not to

object knowing that Pozner -- that Richards', in fact,

criminal conviction and order of the criminal court was to

separate her from James Fetzer, and that I think a

reasonable inference from that is that she was, in fact,

motivated by Fetzer's accusations with regard to Leonard

Pozner, and that's why she chose Leonard Pozner to call

and make those statements. But, I mean, it is what it is.

MR. BOLTON: Can I -- can I make one -- while you're thinking there. What I also recall Mr. Pozner saying, and by the way, the -- the criminal court matter was not -- he was basically -- Lucy Richards was basically told not to access, not just this book, but basically stay away from any of the publications in --

THE COURT: I don't know that. That's not what -- that's not what the testimony --

MR. BOLTON: What I was also --1 2 THE COURT: It may be true. 3 MR. BOLTON: What is part of his testimony is I think that he said, I think that -- I think her 4 5 statements, the statements that she made on the phone 6 call, a lot of the language was -- was similar, taken 7 from -- from -- from --THE COURT: The language out of the book. 8 9 Chapter 11. 10 MR. BOLTON: -- the book. And -- and there's 11 nothing -- the statements that she made have nothing to do 12 with -- they're not even -- there's no similarity between the alleged defamatory statements and her statements at 13 14 all. 15 THE COURT: Okay. All right. Well, it is what 16 it is. Like I said, I thought I -- I mean, the point was without -- it was offered, played to the jury without 17 18 objection, and the jury heard it. Now, if you're asking 19 me then to weigh the public policy and try to untangle it 20 all, for reasons I'll put in the record, I'm not going 21 to -- public policy does not warrant granting your motion 22 for new trial. 23 Okay. I might get this written decision out yet 24 today. I've already told you how it's going to rule.

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will be a final order for purposes. There are no other

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proceedings -- for purposes of appeal. There will be no other proceedings in the circuit court.

I'll make sure -- you know, we have so few jury trials. I'll make sure we sign judgment on the verdict, now having as consistent with the Court's denial of the defendant's post-trial motions.

I guess, just so it's easy to be done, I'd like, Mr. Zimmerman or Ms. Feinstein, someone should draft an injunction. It should be a separate document that's pretty simple. It's just enjoining those four statements. And if there's an alleged contempt then we'll deal with that at the time it's made.

My advice to Mr. -- Dr. Fetzer would be is that he forget about Leonard Pozner and Noah Pozner and as a start to his reorienting his view of the world and leave that family alone.

But if he wants to continue to skirt the limits and maybe go so far as you say, Mr. Zimmerman, which I'm -- I'm not saying I agree with your analysis, but you certainly have leave to raise it at the time, if it becomes a question for the Court, I'll decide it on the motion.

Please tell him though that the consequences of a contempt of an injunction are contempt of court and that the consequences then become more and more serious.

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MR. BOLTON: Yeah. I understand that, Your Honor. I fully understand that.

The -- what -- what troubles me is in regard to Attorney Zimmerman's comments and then Your Honor's comments is that -- that it's not clear then what exactly is enjoined. For instance, I believe that Attorney Zimmerman is suggesting then that the entire book, because the book, to the extent that it denies anyone died at Sandy Hook, that the book then by implication implicates Mr. Pozner -- Pozner. And -- and --

THE COURT: Well, I'm not going to -- I'm not going to resolve that today. And I'm not going to kind of be lulled into confusing the clarity of the scope of the injunction that I think is warranted.

I'm going to issue an injunction that prohibits the four statements that were shown to the jury that the Court found to be defamatory. It's as simple as that.

And I think they're extraordinarily clear. Even if you sort of rephrase them, the core of each of the separate —four separate statements is — is the following:

Mr. -- Dr. Fetzer is enjoined from making the statement that Mr. Pozner's son's death certificate is a fake.

Period. Simple as can be. He's no longer able to say that that death certificate is a fake.

He's no longer able to say that the death certificate

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is a fabrication.

He's no longer able to say that the death certificate is a forgery.

Those are taken directly from the four statements that were shown to the jury and found by this Court to be defamatory.

Now whether he can be creative and cute and nuanced to say something more or to skirt around it, we'll just have to judge him at the time, but you'll give him advice.

I understand Mr. Zimmerman is saying how can you both say that it's not a fake, a fabrication or a forgery and yet say the event which is reflected on the death certificate never happened. I understand what Mr. Zimmerman is saying, but that's a decision that would have to be made in the context of seeing what Dr. Fetzer says.

If I continue to sort of belabor the point, then I -- then I undermine my -- the point that an injunction can be narrowly tailored and concise.

For those reasons, the Court, like I said, is going to deny the defendant's motions, grant the plaintiff's motion for an injunction, and deny the plaintiff's motion for attorney's fees. We'll enter judgment on the verdict and grant the plaintiff statutory

fees and costs. 1 2 Like I said, I might get this decision out 3 before the end of the day. Thank you very much. MS. FEINSTEIN: Thank you, Your Honor. 4 MR. ZIMMERMAN: Your Honor, can I just -- a 5 6 couple very quick housekeeping questions? 7 THE COURT: Yes. MR. ZIMMERMAN: The final judgment, Your Honor, 8 will dismiss the counterclaims, correct? I don't know 10 that we've received an order from the Court formally 11 dismissing --12 THE COURT: Well, that's true. MR. ZIMMERMAN: -- the counterclaims. 13 14 THE COURT: I think we agreed early on that 15 if -- the counterclaims certainly was -- although Dr. Fetzer -- I think I asked you about this at one point, 16 and you said certainly if the verdict is for the 17 18 plaintiff, then there's no abuse of process or fraud upon 19 the court. 20 MR. BOLTON: Right. 2.1 MR. ZIMMERMAN: And I believe it was discussed 22 on the record even, but I'm not sure there's any order 23 from the Court formally dismissing the counterclaims. THE COURT: Do you think there are any viable 24

counterclaims that would preclude this Court from entering

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judgment as a final order, no further proceedings? MR. BOLTON: No, Your Honor. THE COURT: All right. So why don't --MR. ZIMMERMAN: That's fine --THE COURT: -- Mr. Zimmerman --MR. ZIMMERMAN: -- with us. THE COURT: Then the plaintiff, why don't you guys draft a second order, too. I did not address that in my decision on the motions. Draft a second order for that in addition to the injunction. MR. ZIMMERMAN: And, Your Honor, the very last issue is at trial we moved to conform the pleadings -- to amend the pleadings to conform to the evidence, and I think the Court's final judgment probably should address that. We provided evidence that the PDF version of the book included the statements found to be defamatory by the Court. And that was not -- I believe the defendant did not object to plaintiff's motion -- oral motion. THE COURT: Did not, and the Court granted it. But I don't --MR. ZIMMERMAN: That's correct. THE COURT: But I don't -- what -- Do you think I need to do anything more than that? It was on the record in the Court's order unopposed. MR. ZIMMERMAN: I think that's correct. I think

1 we can work with what was on the record in the transcript. 2 That's acceptable. 3 THE COURT: Okay. Do you think I need to do anything more on that, Mr. Bolton? 4 MR. BOLTON: Oh, you've done too much, Your 5 6 Honor, already. No. I'm fine with that, Your Honor. 7 THE COURT: Okay. Thank you very much. Anything else, Mr. Zimmerman? 8 MR. ZIMMERMAN: No, Your Honor. Thank you for 10 your time. 11 THE COURT: Thank you very much. 12 MR. ZIMMERMAN: And for letting me join by 13 phone. I appreciate it. 14 THE COURT: Thank you very much. Ladies and gentlemen, let me just say, I appreciate the quality of 15 16 the legal representation. I especially, whether it might not seem like it 17 18 when you suffer under my withering questions, Mr. Bolton, 19 there's no question I think the attorneys for the 20 plaintiff will recognize that having you here made this 2.1 case a lot better than having gone through it with an unrepresented party. Obviously, the record is replete 22 23 with the fact that Mr. -- Dr. Fetzer was so perhaps 24 earnest in his beliefs that he had trouble staying on 25 point and answering questions succinctly. I want to

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express my appreciate, ironically, for you taking this case and shepherding your client through this, even though maybe it didn't turn out the way it -- it -- your client had hoped.

I had begged your client repeatedly to go out and find a lawyer and he had told me that, repeatedly, that no one wanted to take his case. I know some people have said why would you take his case, but I think that begs the question that it's a credit to the legal profession, the recognition and understanding that even people who defame others are entitled to representation, and I know that I have benefitted greatly by -- in our adversarial system by the issues and the arguments that you've raised. So I appreciate you taking this on and assisting the Court.

MR. BOLTON: Thank you, Your Honor.

THE COURT: And good -- thank you also for the firm of Quarles and Brady and Mr. and Mrs. Zimmerman for coming to the court on this very important case involving such significant and substantial issues. It was really excellent lawyering under rather unfortunate factual circumstances.

Thank you very much.

(Proceeding concluded at 10:43 a.m.)

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1	STATE OF WISCONSIN) ss.)
2	COUNTY OF DANE)
3	I, COLLEEN C. CLARK, Registered Professional
4	Reporter, Official Court Reporter, Branch 8, Dane County
5	Circuit Court, hereby certify that I reported in Stenographic
6	shorthand the proceedings had before the Court on this 12th day
7	of December, 2019, and that the foregoing transcript is a true
8	and correct copy of the said Stenographic notes thereof.
9	On this day the original and two copies of the
10	transcript were prepared by pursuant to Statute.
11	Dated this 25th day of February, 2020.
12	
13	Electronically signed by:
14	Colleen C. Clark
15	COLLEEN C. CLARK, RPR OFFICIAL COURT REPORTER
16	OTTIOTHE COOK! KETOKIEK
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20	The foregoing certification of this transcript
21	does not apply to any reproduction of the same by any means unless under the direct control and/or direction of the certifying reporter.
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